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Political Protest and Political
Transition in South Africa 1994-1995
Bert Klandermans, Marlene Roefs and Johan Olivier
Abstract
Though fairly high levels of protest were maintained in the period
1994-1995, survey responses and other data suggest that its form,
character and constituents may be changing. Surveys conducted in
1994 and 1995 demonstrate that among South Africans language and
ethnicity have become more important in the formation of collective
identity and that commitment to political organisation is slackening.
Neighbourhood, generation and gender have also gained significance
in the way in which black South Africans identity themselves. The data
also indicate a shift in the perception of grievances, with black South
Africans in most respects feeling less aggrieved and less deprived in
1995 than in 1994. Africans' expectations concerning the future have
become even more buoyant whilst white pessimism has intensified.
Patterns of trust and confidence in government among Africans
compared to whites have reversed since 1994. Since 1994 violent
forms of protest have decreased, together with an overall decline in
collective action but there have been more peaceful protest events and
the survey shows that preparedness to engage in peaceful protest
remains high among Africans and is increasing among coloureds.
Political preferences also seem to correlate with degrees of action
preparedness. Increases in trust in government do not translate into
decreased commitment to collective protest.
South Africa is experiencing fundamental social and political change at this
time. The founding elections of April 1994 have signalled the end of the
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apartheid era and black South Africans can now, for the first time, take their
place as full members of society. It is when societies go through periods of
fundamental social change that the probability of conflict and civil strife
increases. Some sectors of the population will expect significant
improvements in their position' now that economic and political barriers
which inhibited upward mobility have been removed. Others will be
concerned about the possibility of a decrease in their standard of living now
that their privileged position is eroding. Still others will experience increased
levels of uncertainty and insecurity - which in itself is associated with times
of significant social change. With apartheid no longer in place as the system
to blame for every grievance, other cleavages may develop in the society and
become grounds for mobilisation. Ethnicity, religion, language or gender may
become the crystallisation point for the formation of new collective identities
which may in turn become politically relevant. Much will depend on the
development of a political climate in South Africa which provides citizens
with the opportunities to participate in political decision-making: on the
development, in other words, of a civil society.
South Africa provides a unique opportunity to investigate profound proces-
ses of transition. A longitudinal study which aims to register the changes in
political opinions, attitudes, and behaviours is an important means to that
end. As a part of the 'Social Movements in South Africa' research project,
therefore, annual surveys of a sample of the South African population are
being conducted during the five years from 1994 through to 1998. Key
questions addressed by these surveys include:
1. What new cleavages will develop in'the course of South Africa's
transitional process - and what new grievances will result from this?
2. To what extent, and influenced by which factors, will those
grievances become the motor of political protest?
In this paper we will highlight some key findings from the first two surveys.
These are especially interesting because they span the first year of transition.
In order to be able to place these findings in their context, however, we will
begin with a brief exposition on the South African social and political
situation during the year 1994-1995.
SOUTH AFRICA'S FIRST YEAR OF TRANSITION
Political protest behaviour has been an integral part of South Africa's
political history since the beginning of this century.1 Levels of protest varied
1. J. L. Olivier, 'Causes of Ethnic Collective Action in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal
Triangle, 1970-84', South African Sociological Review, 2,1990, 89-108.
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a great deal during this period as successive waves of protest were launched
by those excluded from political participation under the country's previous
apartheid system of government. The most recent wave began in the mid-
seventies when Soweto school children mobilised, for the first time, against
apartheid education. The issues over which people mobilised, the social
categories from which they came and the repertoire of collective action have
changed continually since the 1970s.
While peaceful incidents of political protest predominated during the
earlier period, since the mid-eighties violence has become an increasingly
common feature of such events. Two factors explain this change in protest
dynamics. Firstly, levels of engagement between the state and its opponents
became more intense as the state introduced more repressive measures
against individuals and organisations that acted in opposition to its policies.
Secondly, levels of political competition between emerging (new) political
organisations became more intense. This was initially limited to Natal but
spread to other parts of the country soon after the release of political
prisoners and the unbanning of political organisations on 2 February 1990.
Increased levels of political protest since the 1970s played an important
role in initiating and accelerating the process of socio-political change in
South Africa. This process culminated in South Africa's first democratic
elections of 27-29 April 1994, which brought the Government of National
Unity (GNU) into power. Despite the success of the 1994 elections, however,
levels of political protest and violence remained high. This lends support to
the view that the exclusion of the majority of South African citizens from the
country's formal political institutions is not the only (or even the most
important) factor responsible for the high level of protest activities during the
period before the elections.
Similarly, it would be naive to suggest that political protest activities were
the only, or the primary, factors to impact upon political change in South
Africa. Political protest activities are, after all, closely tied to a variety of fac-
tors which have impacted on the process of change during the past few years.
These factors are to be found in the social, economic and political structures
of society. Since these realities provide the context within which the results
of our surveys should be understood, it is important to review in brief the
most significant of these interrelated factors.
The Politics of Transition
During the first year South Africa's democracy was still young and fragile.
The fact of the 1994 elections, however successful they were in and of
themselves, did not turn the country into a democracy. While the elections
provided a necessary foundation upon which to build a democratic society,
the building of a democracy is a long and sometimes difficult endeavour. The
tensions which surfaced from time to time between political parties
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participating in the GNU underscores this point Of particular relevance were
the tensions between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the GNU
regarding the devolution of power to provinces. The IFP finally pulled out of
the Constitutional Assembly responsible for preparing a new Constitution.
Tensions also existed in other sectors of politics, although they were played
out in a less theatrical manner.
The Economics of Transition
Large proportions of the South African population expected significant
changes in their socio-economic position after the 1994 elections. Since the
government was constrained by a massive budget deficit and high debt,
however, it was unlikely that many of these expectations would be met in the
first year. This was particularly so because the South African economy had
been for some time, and will remain for the foreseeable future, in a contracted
state. Various analysts suggest that the annual economic growth rate will
probably not exceed 3 per cent during the next few years. This, coupled with
the fact that the country's population grows at a rate of 2,1 per cent per
annum, suggests that it would be difficult to make a significant impact on
unemployment The results of a recent study2 suggest that the unemployment
rate among South Africa's youth (individuals in the 15-30 age category) in
the formal sector of the economy is 42 per cent. There are limits to how far
the informal sector can accommodate this large number of people. Continued
economic stagnation will result in a widening gap between rich and poor.
While the income gap between African and white remains large, Africans,
coloureds and Asians saw a significant improvement in their personal income
during recent years:3 a finding confirmed by our own research. At the same
time, levels of crime remained very high. Although the state of the country's
economy explains much of this reality, it is important to recognise that
internationalisation of crime in South Africa is another factor. Nevertheless,
unless effective strategies are launched that will impact significantly upon
unemployment crime will become an 'acceptable way of life' for many
South Africans.
THE SURVEYS
Thus far two surveys have been conducted: Survey 1 in February-March
1994, and Survey 2 in February-March 1995.
2. F. Slabbert, C. Malan, H. Marais, J. Olivier and R. Riordan, Youth in the New South Africa:
Towards Policy Formulation (Pretoria, 1994).
3. H. van Wyk, The National and Regional Personal Income of South Africa by Population
Group (Pretoria, 1995).
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In 1994 a representative nationwide sample of 2 286 South Africans of 18
years and older was interviewed. In 1995 a similar sample of 2 226 South
Africans was surveyed. Respondents were interviewed in their homes by
interviewers of the same ethnic background as they were. The interviews
were conducted in English, Afrikaans or in the interviewee's home language
- if needed. The surveys were conducted by Markdata, a branch of the
Human Science Research Council specialising in survey research.
The results that will be reported here concentrate on some key
findings regarding shifting identities, new grievances and modified protest
behaviour.
NEW CLEAVAGES?
One of the questions we phrased concerned the development of new
cleavages and new collective identities. There are various ways of
investigating this. We have used the following two indicators:
(a) Characteristics treated by people as relevant, distinguishing features
in terms of establishing interpersonal bonds and in terms of
characteristics deemed important in interpersonal interaction. The
question to be answered, then, is: Has the weight people give to
various identifiers changed over the past year?
(b) The social, political and cultural organisations people feel committed
to. In this case the question to be answered is: Have people's
commitment to social, political and cultural organisations changed in
the past year?
Of course, assessing relevant identifiers and organisational commitment is
not the same as assessing collective identities,4 but such identifiers and
commitments — especially as they modify — could be indicative of new
collective identities which are emerging; or could become the solidary base
of future collective action.
Relevant Identifiers
In addition to the usual characteristics that are possibly relevant identifiers
(such as social class, gender, generation and political preference), the South
African context provides other potentially important characteristics:
4. See V. Taylor and N. E. Whittier. 'Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities:
Lesbian Feminist Mobilization', in A. Morris and C. Mueller (eds), Frontiers of Social
Movement Theory (New Haven, 1992), 104-30; C. Kelly and S. Breinlinger, The Social
Psychology of Collective Action (Basingstoke, 1995).
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language, religion, ethnicity, and neighbourhoods - four features which are
immediately related to the socio-cultural heterogeneity of the country. Table
1 gives the percentages of respondents for whom, in 1994 and 1995, a
characteristic is a strong identifier. This assessment is based on a composite
of the extent to which a respondent feels close to people with whom he/she
shares some characteristics (language, religion, etc.) and the weight these
characteristics carry in his/her interaction with other people.
Table 1 Relevant Identifiers
blacks cold's Asians whites
'94 '95 '94 '95 '94 '95 '94 '95
language 62 67 49 57 54 56 66 65
religion 46 40 61 71 37 39 69 59
ethnicity 25 30 12 14 21 31 32 32
work 21 18 25 25 15 11 15 20
financial situation 16 14 26 21 07 19 09 14
neighborhood 14 20 25 26 35 19 11 10
generation 12 19 14 15 27 20 17 16
gender 19 25 06 07 08 12 03 04
political preference 22 13 12 12 11 05 17 12
Language and religion were the most important identifiers in both 1994 and
1995. The remaining characteristics were less relevant Multivariate analysis
of variance (MANOVA) shows not only that patterns of identification have
changed over the year (sign, main effect of time, F=9.26, p<.001, df=9), but
more importantly that these changes diverge for the four racial categories
(sign, time x race interaction, F=6.34, p,.001, df=27).
(a) Language became more important among Africans and coloureds, and
remained as important as it was among Asians and whites. As a result,
language has become more important as an identifier.
(b) Religion became less important among Africans and whites, remained
equally important among Asians, and became more important among
coloureds. On balance, religion has become less important
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(c) Ethnicity became more important among Africans and Asians, and
remained equal among coloureds and whites. Thus, ethnicity became
more important as an identifier. We must, however, qualify this
finding: ethnicity is especially important among supporters of the
Inkatha Freedom Party and the white right parties.
Thus, as far as socio-cultural identifiers are concerned, two crucial
characteristics in the South African context, language and ethnicity, have
become more salient and a third, religion, has become less salient.
(d) Work and financial situation, two characteristics related to socio-
economic status, became less important among Africans and
coloureds and more important among whites. Asians provided a
mixed picture.
(e) Neighbourhood, generation, and gender, three characteristics related
to one's social position remained equally unimportant among
coloureds and whites. They became more important among Africans
and less important among Asians. Gender as a characteristic is
virtually irrelevant among whites and coloureds.
(f) Political preference became less important among Africans, Asians
and whites, and remained the same among coloureds. On balance,
political preference became less relevant as an identifier.
Commitment to Organisations
We asked whether respondents were sympathisers, active members or office
bearers of a specified set of organisations - or none of these. Table 2 presents
the means for those organisations we asked about in 1994 and 1995.5 A score
of 1.1 or less means that not even 10 percent sympathises with that
organisation.
The overall impression is that, with one main exception, commitment to
political, social and cultural organisations declined over the past year. Among
Africans, Asians and whites this appears to be a consistent pattern. This may
be due to processes of realignment or the first signs of a process of
individualisation which has been noted in other countries, but it is too early
for any definitive conclusion.
It was the coloureds who, interestingly, had become more rather than less
committed to political organisations, unions and cultural organisations.
The overall decrease in commitment to political organisations is especially
noteworthy among the Africans and the whites. It is in line with the reduced
relevance of political preferences as an identifier - observed in a previous
section.
5. See Appendix.
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Table 2 Commitment to Organizations
blacks cold's Asians whites
'94 '95 '94 '95 '94 '95 '94 '95
political organization 2.0 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.7 1.4
unions 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1
youth organization 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2
civic organization 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
street committee 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
cultural organization 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.3
church organization 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.2 2.4 2.1
Note. Means on a scale from l=none, 2=sympathizer, 3=active member,
4=office holder
In sum. During the first year of transition, except perhaps for the coloureds, a
process of social and cultural diversification seemed to take place.
Traditional social, political and cultural organisations seemed to
have lost significance; identifiers referring to subdivisions within the
major racial categories (such as social class among the whites and
Asians, and language, ethnicity, neighbourhood, generation and
gender among the Africans) had become more important. To what
extent these evolving identities will become politically relevant
remain to be seen.
Language and ethnicity are potentially conflict-generating
identifiers as history has shown elsewhere. The increased
significance of the two may suggest that people are becoming more
sensitive in these matters - especially those who support Inkatha or
the white right - but a year is too short to make any assessment of
that kind. The increasing significance of social class among the
whites may relate to the formation of more distinct class structures
among whites now that apartheid is no longer protecting the white
population. The increased significance of neighbourhood, generation
and gender among Africans certainly relates to the major issues in
South Africa: housing, educational and job opportunities, and the
position of women in society. People's political identities have
become less relevant, especially among Africans and whites. In a
way, this is what one would expect after such a long period of
intense political conflict. Africans and whites were the most
politicised groups in South Africa, as witnessed by both
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commitment and identification. In the aftermath of the political
transition this seems to change. Whether this is a shift toward modal
political behaviour in a society which has been over-politicised for a
long time, or the first signs of a loss of interest or disappointment in
politics, remains to be seen.
NEW GRIEVANCES?
Domains
Grievances may concern different domains and depending on the domain
developments in the year spanning 1994-1995, may have been different We
asked our respondents how dissatisfied they were with their situation - with
regard to seven domains. Table 3 gives the means. Multivariate analysis of
variance reveals significant main effects of race (F=52.96, p<.0001, df=24)
and time (F=12.9, p<.001, df=8) and a significant time x race interaction
(F=10.68, p<001, df=24). In other words, in the first year since the elections
there has been significant change over time. These changes have been
different for the four racial categories, but obviously, the overall pattern
between racial categories remained very much as they were: Afticans are the
most aggrieved, whites the least, and coloureds and Asians share a more-or-
less identical position in between. But, of course, dramatic changes were not
to be expected within one year.
Table 3 Grievances
job/job opportunities
standard of living
conditions in neighborhood
educational opportunities
health care
safety
human rights
blacks
'94 '95
5.0
5.1
4.3
4.6
4.6
4.1
4.7
4.8
5.3
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.0
4.3
cold
'94
4.1
4.5
4.2
3.8
3.8
3.7
4.1
's
'95
3.9
4.6
4.1
3.7
3.9
3.7
4.1
Asians
'94 '95
4.2
4.3
3.7
3.8
3.8
4.0
4.3
4.0
4.3
3.6
4.0
3.7
4.2
3.9
whites
'94 '95
3.2
3.6
3.2
2.9
3.1
3.4
3.5
3.2
3.5
3.0
3.2
3.4
3.3
3.5
Note. Means on a scale from 1= extremely satisfied to 7=extremely
dissatisfied
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As far as Africans are concerned, however, their situation seems to have
developed in the right direction. Except for their standard of living they feel
less aggrieved in 1995 than they did in 1994. To be sure, most changes are
small, but they are significant. Coloureds show very little change in the
evaluation of their situation, for better or worse. Asians are slightly more
satisfied with their socio-economic and human rights situations, but feel more
concerned about education and safety. Whites are the most satisfied with
their socio-economic situation, but are certainly more concerned about
education and health care than they were previously.
In view of socio-economic developments, the results with regard to the
socio-economic domain are surprising. The South African economy is in
the doldrums, and one would have expected this to show up in the form of
more dissatisfaction in socio-economic matters. But the picture is more
complicated. To be sure, Africans and coloureds are more concerned
about their standard of living than they were, but less about jobs and
job opportunities. And, remarkably, whites are more rather than less satisfied
in this respect. Whether this is so because their situation has indeed
improved, or because it worsened less than they feared, is difficult to say at
this point.
The real changes in the perception of the people during that first year seem
to have concerned education and health care. Africans are significantly more
satisfied with these two domains, while whites are significantly more
concerned.
These patterns of change in grievances are reflected in the levels of relative
deprivation reported by each group. We asked everybody to what extent
their situation was better or worse than five years ago, and than that of
other groups in South Africa.6 As we can conclude from Panel A in Figure 1,
Africans and Asians feel less deprived in 1995 than they did in 1994,
coloureds feel the same in both years and whites feel slightly more
deprived.
Expectations for the Future
As far as the generation and continued existence of injustice frames are
concerned, expectations for the future are perhaps even more important
than levels of deprivation. Whether through risen aspirations or heightened
fears, expectations about the future fuel resentment in the present. In that
respect, the results presented in Panel B in Figure 1 are not really comforting.
The already high expectations of Africans have increased even further. In
1994 the high expectations of the coloureds had become less optimistic, and
the already low expectations of the whites had become even more
pessimistic.
6. W. G. Runciman. Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (London, 1996).
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relative deprivation (1-7)
139
4.29
* 3.B9
1995
expectations
of the future (1-7)
I blacks S ^ coloured* 1 I Mian* ^ 3 whlti
South Africa, February 1994-199S
Klandarntajia, B, Olivi.r. X. 1 Roda, M
Figure 1 Relative deprivation and expectations of the future
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In sum. Although Africans felt less aggrieved in 1995 than in 1994, they
certainly expected a lot in the future. The coloureds did not see
many changes and have, perhaps therefore, become more pessimistic
about the future. Asians were less aggrieved and remained slightly
optimistic about the future. Whites felt more deprived and more
pessimistic about the future.
MORE OR LESS POLITICAL PROTEST?
In the decades before transition. South Africa was the scene of intense
political protest - staged predominantly by the African population who were
contesting apartheid. With the Government of National Unity in office, did
political protest increase or decrease, become more moderate or more
militant? We compared (a) the actual occurrence of protest events in the first
three months of 1994 and 1995, with (b) reported participation in protest
events in the past 12 months, and (c) action preparedness in the future. In
addition, we measured trust in government and feelings of political efficacy.7
Political protest aims at challenging authorities. With the political transitions
in mind, one would expect dramatic changes in people's opinions about the
government. Did such changes indeed take place? And if they did, how did
they impact upon political protest?
Trust and Efficacy
Two important dimensions of a citizen's opinion of government are trust and
efficacy: the extent to which people feel that government can be trusted and
influenced. The opposite of trust and efficacy is, of course, political
cynicism: politics as an enterprise upon which ordinary people cannot have
an impact, and government as an institution in which ordinary people cannot
place their trust. With the transfer of formal political power from the white
minority to the formerly oppressed African majority, the politics of apartheid
came to a closure. What did that mean in terms of feelings of trust and
efficacy among South African citizens?
Figure 2 presents the changes in trust and perceived influence as revealed
by our two surveys. These results, although unexpected, are nevertheless
exciting. Multivariate analysis of variance reveals strong main effects of time
(F=70.26, p<.001, df=2), and a strong interaction of time x race (F=85.66,
p<.001, df=6).
In 1994 all four racial categories were about equal on me influence they
estimated to be able to exert on government - around 4 on a scale of 1 to 7,
meaning not too much but not too little either. A year later the pattern is
7. W. A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood. 111., 1968).
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trust
in government (1-5)
2.92
influence
on government (1-7)
> s
,<f
• black* EH colour.** CD lalana ^ »t l lu
South Wricm. F«btu«ty 1994-1995
B. Oliviar. J.. t Ro«(«. M
Figure 2 Evaluation of government: Trust and perceived influence
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changed, not for coloureds and Asians but for Africans and whites. In 1995
Africans felt that they had more, and whites less, influence on government
than the year before. Even more dramatic are the changes with regard to trust
in government. Africans who were the lowest in 1994 are the highest in 1995,
whites who were the highest in 1994 are, in 1995, the lowest. Perhaps
somewhat unexpectedly, coloureds and to a lesser extent Asians had less trust
in government in 1995 than in 1994. Obviously, in the eyes of the Africans
the GNU is their government, unlike the government which was in power in
1994. Not so for whites, coloureds and Asians. As far as the whites are
concerned this is perhaps not surprising, but for the others one would have
expected, or at least hoped, otherwise. Apparently, in its first year the GNU
has not been able to win the confidence of all the people to the extent that it
won that of Africans. In fact, trust in government was restricted to supporters
of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).
Whereas over 50 per cent of the ANC/PAC supporters said they trust
government 'mostly' or 'always,' these figures were 10 per cent for
supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the National Party (NP),
and less than 2 per cent for supporters of the white right. Only among
supporters of the small Democratic Party (DP), some 24 per cent said they
trust government 'mostly'.
Protest Participation
What did that mean in terms of political protest? Have levels of protest
decreased among groups that feel that government has become more open to
their claims (increased trust and efficacy) and increased among groups that
feel that government has become less open (decreased trust and efficacy)?
We have three different criteria in terms of which we can answer this
question: (a) reported protest participation in the past twelve months, (b)
protest event data from the first three months in 1994 and 1995 from our
protest event study, and (c) preparedness to take part in protest events in the
future.
As for reported participation, Table 4 shows a decrease in participation
among Africans and whites in both peaceful, forceful and violent action in
the first year of post-apartheid government, but an increase in reported
participation among coloureds and Asians.
Protest event data for the first three months of both years reveals a sharp
decrease in violent protest events, from 959, in 1994 to 346 in 1995, but an
increase in peaceful protest events, from 109 to 289.
Finally, action preparedness decreased as far as forceful and violent action
was concerned, across all four groups. However, the preparedness to engage
in peaceful action remained high among Africans and low among whites,
while it increased among the coloureds and decreased among the Asians
(Figure 3).
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Table 4 Action Participation in the Past Twelve Months
blacks cold's Asians whites
% % % %
'94 '95 '94 '95 '94 '95 '94 '95
peaceful
forceful
violent
20 15 8 14 1 6 5 3
9 5 2 5 0 0 2 0
5 2 0 2 0 0 1 0
A breakdown of these figures according to political preferences in 1995 is
very informative. Table 5 gives the levels of action preparedness for the four
major political groupings in the country. Obviously, the supporters of the two
'African' parties (IFP and ANC) showed much higher levels of action
preparedness than the supporters of the two 'white' parties (NP and the
Freedom Front (FF)). Importantly, it was the supporters of the IFP and the FF
(the white right) - that is, those who trust the GNU the least within their
racial group — who are proportionally more inclined to take part in forceful or
violent action.
Table 5 Action preparedness of the constituencies of four major political
groupings
Peaceful
Forceful
Violent
IFP
45%
22%
18%
ANC
61%
11%
7%
NP
22%
5%
1%
FF
18%
11%
7%
Apparently, changing opportunities are not identical for everybody, nor are
they perceived alike by every citizen. Much depends on the positions
occupied in the conflict arena. Indeed, in South Africa the challengers have
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action preparedness (1-4)
peaceful actions
forceful actions
violent actions
Iktacka ESS9 Mtoura4« d u U a t Bwh l te *
Souttl Attic*. Fabniwy 1SS4-1SSS
KtamtonMM. B. OlMw. J , » Roaf*. M
Figure 3 Action preparedness
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taken over government. Naturally, their constituencies consider this
as the opening up of new opportunities - to the point that they feel
that there is less need for political protest. But both the movement's
competitors (the IFP) and the former elite (especially the FF) perceive the
new government with suspicion and react with heightened action
preparedness.
The political transitions in South Africa have thus brought a government
into power which is viewed as an ANC/PAC government by both the
Africans and the other racial groups. This has resulted in an increased trust in
government and political efficacy among ANC supporters but reduced trust
and efficacy among the other groupings. These figures did not translate into
protest participation in a simple way. Overall, levels of preparedness to
engage in forceful and violent action decreased, with the important exception
of the supporters of the IFP and the FF whose lack of trust in the new
government does translate into an increased willingness to engage in forceful
and violent action. As far as peaceful action is concerned, the increased trust
in government among the remaining Africans did not make them refrain from
peaceful action. On the contrary, their preparedness to participate in peaceful
action remained high. Protest preparedness among the remaining whites and
the Asians did not increase, although their trust in government and political
efficacy went down as well. This may be due to hesitation to protest against a
government dominated by Africans so shortly after the transition. Be this as it
may, in the final instance lack of trust and efficacy among others than
Africans will not serve political stability.
DISCUSSION
It is far too early to draw any firm conclusions. It remains to be seen whether
any of the observed changes will persist and whether trends will continue
over time. A few remarks can, however, be made in answer to the questions
that guided our research.
Are New Cleavages Emerging?
The increased significance of such identifiers as language, ethnicity,
generation and gender could" mark their emergence as generators of
cleavages. Similarly, the increased political consciousness of coloureds
could signify the development of collective identity within that group.
Coloureds seem to be on their way towards developing a new political
consciousness. They combine the feeling that their situation has not
really improved over the past year with pessimism about the future, reduced
trust in government, and - against the general trend - an increased action
preparedness.
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On the other hand there is a trend of decreasing organisational
commitment. This may be part of the transition process and a symptom of
realignment, or a more pennanent weakening of the social organisation of the
South African society. The future will tell us which of the two explanations is
valid.
Are New Grievances Formulated}
In the 1994-95 period, housing, jobs and educational opportunities have
replaced human and political rights as grievances. The levels of
dissatisfaction in these domains are still very high especially among Africans.
If the government fails to deliver better housing and health care and more
jobs, or to distribute what is available fairly, grievances will certainly mount
in these domains. If it fails to guarantee educational opportunities not only
Africans will be aggrieved, but also Asians and whites; expectations for the
future hint at some foreseeable tension. If their optimistic expectations are
not met, Africans may lose their positive expectations and thus lose their trust
in government To be sure, expectations for the future must not be unrealistic,
but strong feelings of deprivation without hopes for a better future may easily
turn into apathy and resentment.
Is Protest Behaviour Modified.1
In the apartheid era, it was primarily the African population that involved
itself in protest behaviour. As their appreciation of the government in office
shifted dramatically from 1994 to 1995, their participation in collective
action, unsurprisingly, decreased. This does not mean, however, that Africans
are refraining from collective action: they may, on the contrary, still be more
prepared than other groups to take action.
For the first year after the elections the GNU had wide support, and there
were no indications whatsoever at that point of significant groups who
wanted to undermine the South African state. A commitment to nation-
building and reconciliation assisted in stabilising the transition. In the first
year after the elections protest became more peaceful both in terms of actual
behaviour and in terms of the kind of action people were prepared to engage
in. To everybody who is familiar with the South African situation this is a
development which can only be applauded. Because of the closedness of the
political system in the past to anyone but the white elite, politics in South
Africa - both protest and repression - had become very violent. If only a
greater responsiveness of the polity would establish a tradition of more
peaceful protest, much could be gained.
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APPENDIX
In 1995 we added tenants' committees, landowners' committees, education
organisations, and women's organisations. In order to give an impression of the levels
of commitment to these organisations, the following table presents the percentages of
respondents who at least sympathise with an organisation.
Commitment to Social Organisations
Black Col'd Asian White
Political organisation
Unions
Tenants committee
Landowners committee
Education organisation
Youth organisation
Civic organisation
Street committee
Women's organisation
Cultural organisation
Church organisation
Bert Klandermans and Marlene Roefs
Department of Social Psychology
Free University, Amsterdam
Johan Olivier
Human Science Research Council
Pretoria
42,5
13,9
11,9
8,8
19,4
20,3
14,6
14,9
20,0
16,2
49,5
22,2
14,3
6,2
3,8
12,4
20,1
8,8
7,8
10,5
6,9
45,0
9,5
12,8
2,6
1,0
5,1
2,7
1,9
0,3
1,5
7,4
10,9
25,6
6,9
5,2
6,1
14,7
11,6
3,9
5,7
12,0
16,0
50,3
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 0
7:
38
 6
 D
ec
em
be
r 
20
10
